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Introduction
Economic models are often based on the premise that individuals are motivated only by their material self-interest. But experiments systematically reject the pure self-interest hypothesis; see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for an overview. Other considerations, like fairness, do play a role for redistribution. If earnings are a combination of luck (drawn by nature) and e¤ort (chosen by the agent), then fairness urges to compensate individuals for unlucky draws by nature, while it allows individuals to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Empirical evidence shows that (the belief about) the relative importance of e¤ort and luck in the determination of income systematically correlates with people's preferences for redistribution. The more (they believe that) income is determined by luck, the more redistribution is preferred; see Alesina and Giuliano (2010) for an overview of evidence based on social survey data, Gaertner and Schokkaert (2010) for an overview of experimental tests using structured questionnaires, and Konow (2003) for an overview of experimental laboratory evidence.
Fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models. Alesina et al. (2001) show that di¤erent beliefs about the importance of luck for income acquisition can help explain the divergence in the levels of redistribution in di¤erent democratic societies. The political economy models of Piketty (1995) , Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show that multiple equilibria can arise in such a way that stronger beliefs in the role of e¤ort coincide with lower levels of redistribution. Under the in ‡uence of Rawls' (1971) seminal work, a similar notion of fairness has been introduced in the literature on distributive justice; see, e.g., Kymlicka (2002) for an overview.
All these studies share a selective-egalitarian viewpoint: some inequalities in outcomes are justi…able (and should not be corrected), while others cannot be justi…ed (and should be eliminated as much as possible).
This fairness notion has been used to re…ne optimal income tax schemes in the (so-called) fair income tax literature. 1 Although earnings have been the main focus in the previous political economy and fair income tax models, actual tax-bene…t schemes are based on much more information than earnings only. And on average this non-income information turns out to be a more important source of variation in tax payments in Europe and the US. Di¤erent theoretical reasons have been put forward in the optimal income tax literature since Mirrlees'(1971) seminal contribution. 2 If externalities exist, then there is a role for government to subsidize or tax these activities à la Pigou (1920) to restore e¢ ciency. If there exist tags-observable, usually exogenous characteristics that correlate with unobserved abilities or tastes-then Akerlof (1978) shows that di¤erentiating the tax-bene…t system on the basis of these tags ('tagging') can also enhance e¢ ciency. Equity considerations can provide another rationale to di¤erentiate tax-bene…t schemes. The work of Mirrlees (1972) and Boskin and Sheshinsky (1983) discuss the optimal income tax treatment of family size and couples, respectively.
In this paper we want to derive and test a fair and e¢ cient tax-bene…t scheme that is based on several characteristics; and each characteristic can be di¤erent in terms of the degree of control, i.e., the extent to which it can be changed by exerting e¤ort. We preview the core ingredients:
Among the latter, only France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test.
Theory
In the …rst part of this section, we describe the basic building blocks: production technology, individual preferences, and the social preference of a fair and e¢ cient planner. In the second part we describe and discuss the theoretical results, with a focus on two special cases: the 'Mirrlees'-case (one taxable characteristic, say, earnings) and the 'Akerlof'-case (two taxable characteristics, say, earnings and an exogenous tag).
Model
To keep things simple, the model is additive: output is linear in characteristics and characteristics are linear in e¤ort and type, preferences are quasi-linear in (net) output, and the welfare function will average (a concave transformation of) utilities. The additive speci…cation is convenient in terms of interpretation, and it allows capturing the essence of a second-best information problem. We show in the appendix that a multiplicative variant of the model leads to the same qualitative results.
Production technology. Individuals (or households) can be described by a vector x 2 R J , with J a …nite set of characteristics. Although we present the model for an arbitrary number of characteristics, we often focus on the case with one or two characteristics. 3 The pre-intervention or gross outcome is denoted y. It can be anything at this stage, e.g., earnings, life-time income, or a broader concept of welfare. The general model is therefore not necessarily restricted to labor taxation only. Output is assumed to be a linear function of the di¤erent characteristics of the individual, or formally:
Without loss of generality, we assume = j j2J 0, and 0 denotes a vector of zeros of appropriate length. Characteristics are a combination of e¤ort e 2 R J and type 2 R J , i.e., for each j in J we assume
The weights of e¤ort-one weight for each characteristic-are collected in a vector 2 (0; 1) J . This vector is the same for all individuals and de…nes the 'degree of control ' for each characteristic in between the extremes of no control ( j ! 0; the characteristic is pure type) and full control ( j ! 1; the characteristic is pure e¤ort). In contrast to the characteristics, e¤ort and type are not observable to the planner (but the multivariate type distribution is known).
Some special cases arise. First, if there is only one characteristic, say earnings x 1 , and assuming 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, then y = x 1 = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 , and we obtain an additive version of what we call the 'Mirrlees'-case. 4 Next, if there are two characteristics, individual earnings x 1 = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 and a tag, an exogenous characteristic denoted x 2 ! 2 (given 2 ! 0) and if 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, then 3 In the empirical part we will partition all characteristics into two groups such that the theory for two characteristics applies to these two groups as a whole. 4 Since we focus on linear taxes as in Sehshinski (1972) , a better term might be the 'Sheshinski'-case. y = x 1 + 2 x 2 ! ( 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 ) + 2 2 , and we arrive in the so-called 'Akerlof'-case. Note that the tag x 2 ! 2 can both correlate with the earnings ability 1 and a¤ect well-being directly (via 2 > 0).
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Preference technology. Individual utility is equal to the net outcome c (to be de…ned later) minus the cost of e¤ort; no externalities occur. We assume:
U (c; e; ; ) = c P j2J j exp j exp e j j ;
with 2 R J a vector of taste parameters which de…nes the disutility of e¤ort, and 2 R J , with 0, a vector controlling the degree of convexity of the cost of e¤ort. This is a multidimensional version of the classical quasi-linear preferences which are often used in optimal tax theory to simplify the theoretical analysis by excluding income e¤ects (see , e.g., Diamond, 1998) . As usual, higher values for correspond with lower disutility of e¤ort, which can be thought of as more ambitious individuals; higher values for correspond with more elastic responses to e¤ort and can be interpreted as the cost of taxation for the di¤erent characteristics. In contrast to the taste vector , the elasticity vector is assumed to be the same for all individuals.
Net outcomes and behavior. The instruments of the social planner 6 are restricted to 'basic income- ‡at tax' schemes. 7 However, the introduction of non-income characteristics is a far more important source of non-linearity in tax-bene…t schemes. In the countries we analyze in the empirical part, the variation in taxes is mainly explained by non-income characteristics (49% on average) and income (30%), while higher-order terms for income do not play an important role (5%). 8 Therefore, despite being linear in each characteristic, the resulting tax-bene…t scheme is non-linear in income -depending on the correlation and distribution of each characteristic. Finally, we interpret these tax rates as implicit tax rates driving behavior, irrespective of whether or not these rates are explicit in a legal sense. For example, although there is no explicit tax on education, a more progressive tax scheme might reduce the returns to education and could therefore change educational choices. Formally, the net outcome c satis…es
with t 0 2 R controlling the overall level of the net outcome, and t 2 R J the tax rates applied to the di¤erent (observable) characteristics.
Types and tastes are private information; in particular, we assume that individuals know their type when choosing e¤ort. However, all results would remain the same if individuals only knew the distribution of types and e¤ort choices were modeled via expected utility maximization. 9 Lemma 1 summarizes behavior, i.e., choice and indirect utility. 5 Note also that the 'Boskin-Sheshinsky'-model for the optimal taxation of couples can be derived as a special case:
choosing 0 = 0 and 1 = 2 = 1 we have y = x 1 + x 2 with x 1 = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 and x 2 = 2 e 2 + (1 2 ) 2 the earnings of the partners in a couple. We do not further discuss this case here. 6 Note that the …ction of a 'social planner' is a proxy for a more complex political model; see, e.g., Coughlin (1992) , who shows equivalence between a planner with a weighted social welfare function and a probabilistic voting model with two candidates competing for votes. 7 Although restrictive compared to non-linear tax instruments, linear schemes could be close to optimal, at least for income taxation (see, e.g., Mankiw et al., 2009 for a discussion). 8 The remaining part is either unexplained (12%) or due to covariances between the observed characteristics (4%). 9 Types can thus also be interpreted as representing good or bad luck for which individuals ought to be compensated.
Lemma 1. Maximization of (3) with respect to (1), (2) and (4), leads to an e¤ort choice 10 e j = j ln
which results in the characteristics
and the corresponding indirect utility V (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ; ; ) equals (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) + P j2J j
with (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ;
A fair and e¢ cient planner. The planner observes the multivariate type distribution F which is assumed to be independent from the multivariate taste distribution G. 11 For analytical tractability, we use normal distributions, or
with = j j2J a vector of means and = ( ij ) ij2J 2 a variance-covariance matrix with jj > 0 for all j in J and ( ij ) 2 < ii jj for all i; j in J (excluding perfect correlation). The social planner sets taxes t 0 and t to maximize welfare-to be introduced next-subject to a budget constraint, denoted by
with R 0 an exogenous (per-capita) revenue requirement, x j de…ned in equation (6) , and the distributions F and G de…ned in equation (9) . In order to de…ne aggregate welfare, we assume that the planner balances e¢ ciency and fairness. E¢ ciency is operationalized via the Pareto principle, while fairness is de…ned as selective egalitarianism: individuals are held responsible for their tastes, but not for their type. We discuss e¢ ciency and fairness in an informal way in the next paragraph; see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a formal discussion.
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A Pareto e¢ cient planner de…nes welfare as an increasing function of individual well-being, and wellbeing is a speci…c cardinalization of utility de…ned in (3) . But which cardinalization is normatively interesting? Fairness considerations can guide us. A selective egalitarian planner is egalitarian, but only with respect to those outcome di¤erences that are caused by di¤erences in type for which individuals are not (held) responsible. We select two plausible principles, compensation and responsibility. If two individuals have the same tastes and make exactly the same e¤ort choices, then any remaining outcome di¤erences can be traced back to di¤erences in type, which are deemed relevant for redistribution. In this case the compensation principle approves of progressive Pigou-Dalton transfers, i.e., mean-preserving transfers from the richer to the poorer individual. If all individuals have the same type, then outcome di¤erences in the laisser-faire allocation-i.e., the allocation which would be chosen by individuals in the absence of taxation-are only due to di¤erences in tastes, which are deemed irrelevant for redistribution.
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Figure 1: direct well-being u in the additive 'Mirrlees'-case
So, if all individuals have the same type, there is no reason to redistribute and the responsibility principle requires that the laisser-faire allocation should result.
We de…ne the social planner's objective …rst, and link it back to e¢ ciency and fairness afterwards.
The social planner maximizes a Kolm-Pollak welfare function, i.e., welfare is a sum of increasing and concave exponential functions of well-being. Well-being is de…ned as a speci…c cardinalization of utility.
More precisely, the (direct) well-being in a given bundle (c; e), denoted u (c; e; ; 0 ; ; ; ; ), is implicitly de…ned as the hypothetical type H = (u; u; : : : ; u) which makes an individual indi¤erent between (1) the actual received bundle (c; e) and (2) the bundle the individual would choose-with her own tastes, but with this hypothetical type H -in the laisser-faire, here de…ned as (t 0 ; t) = (R 0 ; 0). Figure 1 illustrates the construction of direct well-being for the Mirrlees-case (with y = x 1 = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 ), obtained by changing the intercept of the laisser-faire budget set (a budget line with intercept (1 1 ) u R 0 and slope 1 ) such that it is tangent to the indi¤erence curve through the bundle (c; e 1 ); Lemma 2 derives the corresponding direct well-being index formally.
Lemma 2. Given a bundle (c; e), direct well-being u is implicitly de…ned by U (c; e; ; ) = V (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ; ; (u; u; : : : ; u)) with V the indirect utility function de…ned in Lemma 1. This results in u (c; e; ; 0 ; ; ; ) equal to
A social planner who maximizes a sum of increasing and concave exponential functions of well-beingwith well-being de…ned in Lemma 2-is both Pareto e¢ cient and selective egalitarian. Pareto e¢ ciency 1 0 We de…ne e j ! 1 for all tax levels t j > j . 1 1 Independence avoids the philosophical problem of whether we can hold individuals responsible for their tastes, if the latter correlate with type. 1 2 A similar proposal has been made by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) .
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follows from the observation that welfare is increasing in well-being and well-being is a speci…c cardinalization of utility. For the compensation principle, note that direct well-being does not depend on type such that well-being di¤erences between individuals with the same tastes and the same e¤ort can only be due to di¤erences in their net outcome c. Since welfare is a concave function of well-being and well-being is linear in net outcome c, Pigou-Dalton transfers increase welfare. To see why the responsibility principle holds, it is more convenient to work with the corresponding indirect well-being function, i.e., well-being measured at the bundle chosen by an individual for a given tax-bene…t scheme (t 0 ; t). Lemma 3 provides us with the indirect well-being formula.
Lemma 3. Given a tax-bene…t scheme (t 0 ; t), indirect well-being v is implicitly de…ned by V (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ; ; ) = V (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ; ; (v; v; : : : ; v))
with V the indirect utility function de…ned in Lemma 1. 13 This results in v (t 0 ; t; ; ; ; ; ) equal to (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; )
From lemma 3 it follows that if all individuals have the same type, then they all obtain the same well-being level in the laisser faire de…ned by (t 0 ; t) = (R 0 ; 0). As a consequence, deviating from t = 0 would decrease welfare, since both average well-being would decrease due to the e¢ ciency cost of taxation and well-being inequality would increase.
Results

General result
The program of the social planner is to choose a tax-bene…t scheme (t 0 ; t) in order to maximize welfare, a sum of increasing and concave exponential transformations of (indirect) well-beings, subject to a budget constraint; formally:
subject to the budget constraint (10), with r > 0 the inequality aversion parameter, R 0 the exogenous (per-capita) revenue requirement, indirect well-being v (t 0 ; t; ; ; ; ; ) de…ned in lemma 3, and the distributions F and G de…ned in equation (9) . Proposition 1 characterizes the general solution.
Proposition 1. The solution to the social planner's problem is characterized as follows:
1. the budget constraint (and e¢ ciency) leads to
which can be plugged in in the welfare function to obtain welfare as a function of t; ; ; ; r; R 0 ; ; ;
as de…ned in the appendix; 1 3 Note that V (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ; ; (v; v; : : : ; v)) is strictly increasing in v, so v is well-de…ned and unique. 8 2. maximizing the previous welfare function w.r.t. t leads to a system of …rst-order conditions (one for each j in J) de…ned as
The solution t satis…es t and is a global maximum.
Proof. See appendix.
There is little we can say in general. If the planner does not care about compensation (r ! 0) or if compensation is an empty requirement due to type homogeneity ( ! 0), then the laisser-faire results,
i.e., (t 0 ; t ) = (R 0 ; 0), in the optimum. In the sequel we discuss two speci…c cases: the 'Mirrlees'-case, in which the outcome is de…ned by one endogenous characteristic (income), and the 'Akerlof'-case with an endogenous and an exogenous (non-controllable) characteristic (a tag). Especially the second case will provide us with testable hypotheses that do not depend on the (perceived) degree of control or the inequality aversion r. This makes it particularly suitable for cross-country comparisons.
The ' Mirrlees' -case
To set the stage, we start with the simplest case possible. Suppose the outcome y is de…ned by one characteristic only, say earnings x 1 , with y = x 1 = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) 1 . The system of …rst-order conditions in proposition 1 reduces to
We sum up the di¤erent theoretical results here; formal derivations can be found in the appendix. The tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 :
1. lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t 1 < 1;
2. decreases with the elasticity of e¤ort 1 , ranging from complete taxation, in the case of perfect inelastic e¤ort (t 1 ! 1 if 1 ! 0), to no taxation, in the case of perfect elastic e¤ort (t 1 ! 0 if
3. increases with the inequality aversion r, ranging from no taxation if the planner is inequality 14 The system of …rst-order conditions reduces to
with = (1 1 ) + 2 here. The complete comparative statics results can be found in the appendix. Here we highlight that the tax rate on earnings t 1 also satis…es points 1-6 as described in the previous Mirrlees-case. 15 In addition, in the limiting case of perfect type correlation ( 12 2 ! 11 22 ) the tax rate on earnings t 1 reduces to zero and all taxation can be done via the tax t 2 on the tag, since the latter is a perfect signal of earnings ability and it can be taxed at no cost.
More interesting for our purposes is that the second of the …rst-order conditions can be rewritten as
Two special cases are immediately clear from equation (14) . In the absence of a needs e¤ect of the tag ( 2 ! 0), only the signal can play a role. Then the optimal (read: e¢ cient) tax on the tag reduces to
, which is positive (negative) if the tag signals a higher (lower) ability to earn. In the absence of a signal ( 12 = 0), only the needs play a role. In this case, the optimal (read: equitable) tax on tag t 2 equals 2 , i.e., the gross e¤ect of the tag should be taxed away. In general, equity and e¢ ciency together require t 2 = 2 + ( 12 = 22 ) (1 t 1 ) (1 1 ), i.e., tax away the needs e¤ect, corrected for the signal value of the tag.
Another way to interpret equation (14) is that the (expected) total marginal e¤ect of the tag 2 on the net outcome c should be equal to zero in a fair tax-bene…t system, i.e., outcome di¤erences due to non-controllable characteristics (exogenous tags) should be fully compensated. To see this, note that this total e¤ect consists of two parts. The …rst part ( 2 t 2 ) is the direct marginal e¤ect of 2 on the net outcome c. The second part can be interpreted as the indirect marginal e¤ect of 2 on c: it is equal to 12 = 22 , the (expected) marginal e¤ect of 2 on 1 , 16 multiplied by (1 t 1 ) (1 1 ), the marginal e¤ect of 1 on c.
To test equation (14), we must be able to rewrite it in terms of empirically observable quantities.
Fortunately, we can use lemma 1 to see that
which implies that x 12 = (1 1 ) 12 and x 22 = 22 . Using these formulas, we obtain the empirical counterpart of the theoretical formula (14):
Note that neither the degree of control 1 nor the inequality aversion r have to be observed to test it.
Equation (15) is the theoretical basis for two hypotheses that we will derive next and test in the empirical part later on. 17 Rejection of the hypotheses would indicate that the planner is either ine¢ cient or unfair in the above sense (or both). Note …rst that the expected net outcome, conditional on the tag, can be written as
The derivative of E (cjx 2 ) w.r.t.
This allows us to rewrite equation (15) as
A …rst empirical hypothesis is whether the actual tax rates guarantee that the marginal e¤ect of the tag on the conditional expectation of the net outcome is equal to zero. To derive a second and weaker hypothesis, we choose 2 = 1 in the sequel; this will be true in the empirics later on by construction. In this case, we
and as before,
Now, t 2 t 1 must hold, if and only if
where the equality follows from rewriting equation (15) in terms of t 2 . Using the fact that 1 t 1 > 0 in the optimum, we get that
A second weaker hypothesis is whether the actual tax rate on the tag is larger than the actual tax rate on earnings whenever the the tag has a positive marginal e¤ect on the conditional expectation of the gross outcome (and vice-versa, whether the tax on the tag is smaller in case of a negative e¤ect). 1 7 An interesting open question is whether these hypotheses can also be derived in a more general tax reform approach.
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3 Evidence
Model
Before setting up the empirical model, we start with four remarks. First, in the empirical analysis, unfortunately, type and e¤ort are not directly observable. Hence, the identi…cation comes from the di¤erences in the degree of control of our characteristics. However, we do not observe the precise degree of control for each characteristic. Therefore, we distinguish between non-controllable characteristics beyond individual control (we use age, sex and disability later on) and all other characteristics which are deemed partially controllable. Therefore, in this section, we re…ne the more general theoretical model in order to accommodate the data. Second, we make a distinction between covariates and characteristics: a characteristic can consist of several covariates, but not vice-versa. We provide two examples. The covariates for the characteristic 'education' are the di¤erent education dummies. The covariates for the characteristic 'no control' will consist of all covariates of the characteristics which are deemed beyond individual control.
The last example illustrates that it is possible to create two composite characteristics, 'partial control'and 'no control', out of a …nite set of covariates. Such a partitioning will allow us to test the theoretical predictions of the 'Akerlof'-case in equation (15) later on. Third, an error term is inevitable in empirical work.
It will play the role of an additional 'unobserved'characteristic in the sequel. Since the error term is by assumption independent of the other covariates, adding it in the theoretical model as a third independent characteristic would not have changed the theoretical results. Fourth, many observable characteristics are not explicitly taxed in practice, but only implicitly, e.g., due to the progressivity of the tax system. For a correct interpretation later on, we de…ne the implicit tax rate on a characteristic as the tax rate on that part of the outcome that can be attributed to the characteristic.
Let z denote a vector of covariates, which can be decomposed as z = (z j ) j2J , with z j the covariates for characteristic j in J. Let ' 'denote a vector product; the gross output regression can be written as
which brings us back to the theoretical model (equation (1)), de…ning 0 w 0 , 1 (a vector of ones) and x ((w j z j ) j2J ; ) the vector of characteristics, including the unobserved one. The tax (or subsidy, if negative) equals
Equations (18)- (19) directly suggest a simple two-step approach to estimate the tax rates t 0 and t. First, estimate equation (18) by multivariate OLS, which provides us with estimates b w j . We then build pre-
The term b w j z j is the estimated contribution of characteristic j to the gross outcome y. Second, estimate equation (19) by multivariate OLS, replacing x by the prediction b x and correcting the standard errors for these added regressors (Maddala, 2001, p360 ).
This multivariate regression gives us the implicit tax rates on the parts of gross outcome that can be attributed to the di¤erent characteristics.
Data
We 18 In the remainder we sometimes classify countries in groups and talk about the Continental, 19 the Northern, 20 the Southern, 21 the Anglo-Saxon, 22 the Central Eastern, 23 and the Baltic 24 countries.
In addition to the EU-SILC, we use data from IPUMS-CPS ( We provide a de…nition of the income components and summary statistics in the data appendix. 25 We select single and couple households with or without children in households attached to the labor market. In our preferred speci…cation we estimate a joint model on the pooled data. As a robustness check, we will conduct separate estimations for singles and couples; see appendix. We also trim the top and bottom 1% of the income distribution in order to avoid estimation problems due to extreme outliers.
Since needs (e.g., the number of children) are a crucial determinant of existing tax-bene…t systems, we use equivalent gross household income as our preferred outcome measure; again, robustness checks will be provided in the appendix. To make incomes comparable across countries, we adjust national income amounts by the multilateral current purchasing power parities provided by Eurostat. The analysis only allocates those taxes and bene…ts that can be reasonably attributed to households. Therefore, corporate taxes as well as some types of government expenditures, such as expenditure on defense, are not considered.
Due to data limitations, indirect taxes and in-kind bene…ts cannot be taken into account either. Thus, in the remainder we merely focus on cash bene…ts when speaking of social bene…ts and on personal income taxes in the case of taxes.
We construct the following characteristics. The characteristic 'sex' contains a gender dummy, 'age' contains several dummies for di¤erent age classes, 'disability'is constructed using information on disability status and the receipt of certain disability bene…ts, 'foreign' contains two dummies for born outside of the country but within the EU and born outside the EU. The covariates for the characteristic 'education' simply consist of di¤erent education dummies (4 levels according to the ISCED de…nition), 'needs'contains information about the number of children (in three age groups) together with the number of additional adults, 'couple'is a dummy for living as a couple, and 'unemployed'contains a dummy for not working. In our preferred speci…cation, we use individual level covariates and characteristics, but again, as a robustness check, we will also perform and report the estimations on the household level in the appendix (using averages of the individual covariates of the head of the household and, eventually, his or her partner). 1 8 The survey is representative for the whole population in each country due to the construction of population weights. 1 9 Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France (FR), Luxembourg (LU) and the Netherlands (NL). 2 0 Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Iceland (IS), Sweden (SE), and Norway (NO). 2 1 Cyprus (CY), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Italy (IT) and Portugal (PT). 2 2 Ireland (IE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). 2 3 The Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI) and the Slovak Republic (SK). 2 4 Estonia (EE), Lithuania (LT) and Latvia (LV). 2 5 See also Fuest et al. (2010) for more details. 13 
Results
We start with estimating the implicit tax rates for the di¤erent determinants of outcomes. Although our theory reveals little about the levels of compensation, the answer to the question how much countries compensate for the e¤ect of di¤erent characteristics is, we believe, interesting in its own right. Afterwards, we return to the theory and derive and test two hypotheses: do countries compensate more for noncontrollable characteristics compared to (partially) controllable ones and is the total e¤ect of the noncontrollable characteristics equal to zero?
How much do we compensate for di¤erent characteristics?
We estimate the implicit tax rates for each characteristic (i.e., 'age', 'sex', 'disability', 'couple', 'needs', 'foreign', 'unemployed', and 'education') separately. 26 Recall that we use a two-step estimation procedure based on (18)- (19) to estimate the implicit tax rates. The implicit tax rate for a characteristic that consists of a single dummy only is equal to = y , with the e¤ect of the dummy on the tax paid (or subsidy received) in the second step and y the e¤ect of the dummy on the gross outcome in the …rst step. As a consequence, the implicit tax rate can become very unstable if the …rst step estimate of y is close to zero. Therefore, Table (1) only reports estimates for the implicit tax rates of those characteristics which were signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (at the 95%-level) in the …rst step of the estimation procedure; the complete …rst-and second-step regression results are reported in the appendix.
We order characteristics (the columns of Table 1 ) on the basis of the average implicit tax rate over the di¤erent countries (reported in the last row), while we order countries (the rows of Table 1 ) on the basis of their average implicit tax rate over the di¤erent characteristics (reported in the last column). First, the estimated implicit tax rates are typically positive. This means that outcome di¤erences due to the di¤erent characteristics are reduced in most of the countries, e.g., due to progressive taxes and/or speci…c bene…ts. Second, in some countries the tax rates are higher compared to others. Generally speaking, we …nd the Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries as well as the Baltic states at lower levels of compensation and the Continental, Central Eastern and Northern countries at higher levels. Third, the tax rates are also di¤erent for di¤erent characteristics. We …nd the following order of compensation: there is most support for the elderly, followed by the disabled, the unemployed and families with children, less support towards foreigners and the educated, and …nally, least to women and singles. 27 This revealed order of compensation is, generally speaking, in line with sociological research on attitudes on social spending, where the typical order of deservingness is old people, the sick and disabled, needy families with children, and the unemployed; see the seminal work of Coughlin (1980).
Back to theory
The novelty of the theoretical part is the introduction of partial control. Although we do not observe the precise degree of control in reality, the least we can say is whether some characteristics are beyond control or not. To proceed, we partition the set of observable characteristics J into a set of characteristics with no control (N ) and a set with partial control (P ). For the 'no control' composite we choose the covariates underlying the characteristics 'age', 'sex', and 'disability', whereas the 'partial control'composite 2 6 Note that we do not include the implicit tax rate for the unobserved part. Since the unobserved part is independent of the other characteristics by assumption, its implicit tax rate is always close to the overall tax rate. 2 7 In the appendix we discuss the robustness of this order of solidarity w.r.t. the empirical speci…cation.
14 contains 'couple', 'needs', 'foreign', 'unemployed', and 'education'. 28 The most controversial issue is certainly age. As earnings are usually increasing over the working-life, our cross-sectional design captures redistribution from older individuals earning more to younger individuals eraning less depending on the progressivity of the tax system. With a su¢ ciently long panel, it would be possible to take a more appropriate life-time perspective. 29 We keep the residual error term, labelled 'unobserved', as a separate 2 8 The assignment of 'foreigner' and 'disability' to either category can be disputed. Our choice can be justi…ed in the following way: We do not observe whether it was an individual's choice to move to a foreign country or not. Hence, we consider this characteristic as (potentially) partial controllable. For disability status, we try to focus on inborn handicaps which are beyond individual control. However, our main results remain una¤ected when altering these choices. 2 9 As an alternative, we could assume that younger cohorts will receive in the future what older cohorts receive now. This would allow to construct a life-time well-being index.
15 independent characteristic. 30 We can use equation (18) again, with x now decomposed as (x N ; x P ; x U ) = P j2N w j z j ; P j2P w j z j ; . The weak hypothesis in equation (17) tells us when the non-controllable characteristics should be taxed more compared to the partially controllable ones. In the current notation, we have Weak hypothesis: t N t P holds if and only if
0 holds can be tested in a straightforward way, since the OLS-estimate of b in the regression
is equal to
as a fairness measure: it is the total marginal e¤ect of the non-controllable characteristics on the conditional net outcome. The closer to zero, the fairer the tax-bene…t system is, because in the optimum, outcome di¤erences due to exogenous tags should be fully compensated. The following stronger hypothesis deals with the fairness of tax-bene…t systems in di¤erent countries and follows directly from equation (16):
But how can we estimate F M ? The net outcome c equals
Plugging (20) into (22) , and replacing by b by
Equation (23) provides us with a two-step procedure: …rst, estimate equation (18) 
Does compensation depend on the degree of control?
We want to test the weak hypothesis here. Table (7) in the appendix reports
The null is rejected for each country. As a consequence, hypothesis 1 predicts that t N t P should hold, i.e. the implicit tax rate for the no-control composite should be larger than the one for the partial control composite in each country.
To check whether this prediction is true, Figure 2 shows the implicit tax rates for all countries for the 'no control'and the 'partial control'composite along with the 95% con…dence bands. Countries are ordered 3 0 Neither the theoretical results nor the empirics change. First, if we add a third characteristic to our theoretical model with an underlying taste and type distribution which is pairwise independent of the underlying tastes and types of the other characteristics, then the theoretical relation between the …rst two remains unchanged. Second, one could think of adding the error term to either the 'no control'or 'partial control'composite, but, again due to its independence, this does not change the empirical results.
16 on the basis of the overall tax rate. 31 Countries with higher overall tax rates also tend to compensate more for both composites, but the link is far from perfect: Luxembourg, Portugal and Poland have moderate overall tax rates, but among the highest implicit tax rates for characteristics beyond control. In line with the theoretical part, the implicit tax rate on (partially) controllable factors is always signi…cantly below the tax rate for non-controllable factors in all countries. On average, we obtain a tax rate equal to 0:80 and 0:40 for non-controllable and partially controllable characteristics, respectively. We show in the appendix that this result is very robust with respect to the chosen empirical speci…cation.
As can be seen in Table ( 1), this result also holds if we compare the non-controllable characteristics age and disability separately with each of the partially controllable ones. Still, it would not hold for the characteristic sex in some countries. If we look at the dispersion in the implicit tax rates for the characteristic sex in the di¤erent countries, it turns out to be the most disputed characteristic.
For the interpretation of these results, note again that we look at implicit tax rates on the parts of the outcome that can be attributed to the di¤erent characteristics. Since income is positively correlated with age, the progressivity of the tax-bene…t system in each country leads to high implicit tax rates on outcome di¤erences due to age. Countries with lower progressivity (especially the Baltic ‡at tax countries) have lower implicit tax rates on age. A similar rationale applies to disability: its income di¤erences are usually compensated through rather generous disability bene…t schemes. Hence, countries with lower bene…t levels (mainly from Eastern Europe) have lower implicit tax rates on disability. The rather low implicit tax rates on sex imply that the tax-bene…t system does not reduce the gender wage gap other than through the progressivity of the system. Due to anti-discrimination laws, explicit gender based taxation is prohibited in the EU and the US. Implicit tax di¤erences arise through the de…nition of tax units (individual vs. joint taxation) and the de…nition of rules and conditions such that individual with certain circumstances are more likely to be eligible for it.
In order to better understand the role played by taxes, contributions and bene…ts separately, we decompose the total tax amount in equation (19) as
with y (equivalized) income taxes, c (equivalized) social security contributions and b (equivalized) bene…ts (and tax credits). We can do the second step estimation separately for each component, i.e., y = t y;0 + t y x , ss = t ss;0 + t ss x , and
again with x = (x N ; x P ; x U ). We obtain = (t y;0 + t ss;0 + t b;0 ) + (t y + t ss + t b ) x;
with t = t y + t ss + t b a vector of tax rates, one rate for each composite characteristic in x = (x N ; x P ; x U ), which can now be decomposed over income taxes, social security contributions and bene…ts. The estimated tax rates for t y , t ss and t b , expressed as shares of the overall tax rate t, are reported in Figure 3 for 'no control'(upper panel) and 'partial control'(lower panel); countries are again sorted on the basis of their overall tax rate.
Not surprisingly, bene…ts tend to be relatively more important compared to taxes in the compensation for non-controllable characteristics. Still, half of the compensation for non-controllable characteristics is due to taxes, e.g., because earnings, and thus also taxes in a progressive tax scheme, tend to increase with age. In the 'partial control'-case, taxes have the highest relative importance in all countries. Both cases together indicate that bene…ts are mainly used to compensate for non-controllable factors whereas taxes are mainly used for compensating the non-controllable part in partially controllable characteristics.
In the appendix we provide the same decomposition for each characteristic separately. If we look at the non-controllable factors (age, disability and sex), this …gure con…rms that pensions and disability bene…ts play a big role in compensating the income e¤ect of age and disability, while progressive taxes tend to compensate for sex.
How fair are tax-bene…t systems?
To test the stronger hypothesis, the point estimates and con…dence intervals for the fairness measure F M de…ned in (21) are plotted in Figure 4 for each country. A value of this 'fairness measure' greater than zero implies that the compensation for the 'no control' characteristics is too low relative to the 'partial control'composite and vice-versa. The greater the distance from zero, the less fair a country.
Generally speaking, the …gure shows three chains of countries: a …rst group with a fair tax-bene…t system In the appendix we show that the empirical speci…cation does not matter for the ranking of the countries (although the numbers can be di¤erent, especially when using income rather than equivalent income).
In contrast with the weak hypothesis, the strong hypothesis can be rejected for all countries except
France and Luxembourg. France and Luxembourg have a high implicit tax rate for non-controllable characteristics in common, but clearly note that their overall tax rate is not necessarily high compared to other countries. Note also that some other Continental countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) as well as Hungary and Poland come close to being fair. If we only look at the countries with a good perfor- mance, the degree of compensation for the non-controllable characteristics seems to be the crucial factor.
We also know that age is by far the most important factor among the non-controllable ones; note, for instance, that the variation of the non-controllable composite due to age accounts on average for more than 80% of the explained variation. This might also explain why the Northern countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland), with a moderate to low public spending on public Pensions, can be found among the worst performers in the intermediate group (see OECD, 2009). More generally, it begs the question whether the second-and third-pillar contributions and bene…ts should also be taken up in the output de…nition. 32 The way to improve fairness can be rather di¤erent in di¤erent countries. Recall equation (21) and
To improve fairness, all countries must lower F M , the total e¤ect that the non-controllable characteristics have on net outcome. According to the decomposition in Figure ( 3) they can do so by changing the bene…ts (which mainly impacts t N ) and by changing (the progressivity of) income taxes (which changes t P and t N ). For the worst performing countries (Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and the United States), the ratio Figure 3 suggests that changing (the progressivity of) income taxes has a bigger impact on t P compared to t N . Therefore, lowering (the progressivity of) income taxes could be helpful to improve fairness in these countries.
Conclusion
There is ample evidence from surveys and experiments that fairness plays a role in redistributive issues. Individuals want to compensate others for their misfortune, while they allow them to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Such fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models. We introduce fairness as a device to select among e¢ cient tax-bene…t schemes that are based on several characteristics. In addition, we introduce partial control: characteristics di¤er in the degree of control, i.e., the extent to which they can be changed by exerting e¤ort. We derive two testable predictions.
The tax rate on partially controllable characteristics should be lower compared to the tax rate on noncontrollable characteristics, and the total e¤ect of non-controllable characteristics on the post-tax outcome should be equal to zero.
We estimate implicit tax rates for a set of characteristics in 26 European countries (using the 2007 EU-SILC data) and the US (using the CPS data). We …nd a robust tendency in all countries to compensate more for the uncontrollable composite characteristic (based on sex, age and disability) compared to the partially controllable one (based on family composition, immigration status, unemployment and education level). We also estimate the total e¤ect of the non-controllable composite on the post-tax outcome and test whether it is equal to zero. Only France and Luxembourg pass the fairness test. Although this result is sensitive to the empirical speci…cation, the ranking of countries in terms of fairness tends to be robust. The way in which countries can improve fairness depends on the variance-covariance structure of the characteristics. For the worst performing countries (Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and the United States), the analysis suggests that increasing (the progressivity of) income taxes could increase fairness considerably. For most of the other countries, the opposite is probably true. One caveat applies. Age is an important factor in the non-controllable composite. Since we can only include …rst-pillar pensions, the fairness measure is biased to the advantage of the (continental) countries with a generous public pension scheme. However, as we focus on households attached to the labor market, the bias is probably not that large.
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Proof of proposition 1
The planner solves
subject to the budget constraint
and well-being of an individual v (t 0 ; t; ; ; ; ; ) is de…ned as (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; )
with (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ) equal to
Before analyzing the solution, notice that the optimal tax rates t must satisfy t . As de…ned before,
x j remains the same for all tax levels t j j , so it su¢ ces for the planner to look at tax rates t j < j and t j = j . In addition, a solution with t j = j (and t 0 ! +1) can never be e¢ cient (the laisser faire is better for everyone), leaving us with t j < j for each j in J, as required.
First, e¢ ciency requires that the budget constraint is satis…ed with equality. Given independent (multivariate normal) distributions for and , we simply get
We can plug in this equation in the expression (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ), to get
and we can rewrite welfare W = A + B + C with
Given a multivariate normal distribution for an arbitrary vector, say z with z~N ( z ; z ), we can use the following result
Maximizing welfare leads to a system of equations, one for each j in J, de…ned as
we get
Putting everything together (and multiplying by
for each j in J.
Finally, to establish concavity, we directly focus on the case of two characteristics; the case of one characteristic can be seen from it as well:
The Hessian matrix H = 1=
2
, and has the following entries: which is non-negative, as required.
A multiplicative model
We outline a multiplicative (i.e., log-linear) variant of our model and show that the resulting optimal tax formula remains the same. We stick to the same notation as in the main text.
Production technology. The pre-intervention or gross outcome is denoted y and is assumed to be a log-linear function of the di¤erent characteristics of the individual; formally:
with 0 > 0 and = j j2J 0. Characteristics are a combination of e¤ort e 2 R J and type 2 R J in a multiplicative Cobb-Douglas way, i.e., for each j in J we assume
The weights of e¤ort-one weight for each characteristic-de…ne the 'degree of control 'for each characteristic. The multiplicative Mirrlees model can be obtained by choosing jJj = 1; 0 = 1; 1 = 2 and 1 = 1=2
which leads to y = 1 e 1 . Choosing jJj = 2; 0 = 1; 1 = 2, 1 = 1=2 and 2 = 0, the multiplicative version of Akerlof's model equals y = ( 1 e 1 ) = ( 2 ) 2 where ( 2 ) 2 is a relative equivalence scale factor that adjusts income 1 e 1 for needs (in case 2 6 = 0).
Preference technology. We assume quasi-loglinear preferences, or:
ln U (c; e; ; ) = ln c P with t 0 controlling the overall level of the net outcome, and t 2 R J the tax rates applied to the di¤erent (logarithmic) characteristics. The optimal e¤ort equals e j = j j t j j j for all j in J, or, equivalently, ln e j = j ln j + j ln j t j + j ln j for all j in J.
This results in characteristics
and the (logarithm of the) corresponding indirect utility V (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ; ; ) equals ln V = (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) + P j2J j t j j j ln j + P welfare function subject to the budget constraint; formally, for a given r > 0:
Indirect well-being v is again de…ned as a speci…c cardinalization of indirect utility, i.e., V (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ; ; ) = V (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ; ; (v; v; : : : ; v)) ; which leads to ln v (t 0 ; t; ; ; ; ; ) being equal to (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; )
Givne e¢ ciency, the budget constraint must hold with equality, which allows us to derive t 0 as
We can de…ne = (t 0 ; t; ; 0 ; ; ) (R 0 ; 0; ; 0 ; ; ), and rewrite it, given the formula for t 0 as
The government's maximand can be equivalently written as max t0;t ln R R exp ( r ln v (t 0 ; t; ; ; ; ; )) dF ( ) dG ( ) 1 r and using the expression for in ln v the problem reduces to max t A + B + C; 3 3 Although somewhat arti…cial-R 0 does not have a money interpretation-, higher values for R 0 still corresponds to a higher government requirement. In addition, note that ln y ln c (y c ) =c , so R 0 can be interpreted as a minimal requirement on the mean average tax rate in society.
with
Taking partial derivatives (and de…ning :=
adding up and multiplying with 2 > 0 brings us back to the same system of …rst-order conditions
for each j in J, as in Proposition 1.
The Mirrlees-case
In case of one characteristic and 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, we get
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t 1 < 1:
We know from proposition 1 that t 1 < 1. In addition, also t 1 > 0 must hold, since t 1 0 cannot satisfy the …rst-order condition.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 decreases with the elasticity 1 from complete taxation if the elasticity approaches zero (t 1 ! 1 if 1 ! 0) to no taxation if the elasticity becomes very high (t 1 ! 0
If 1 ! 0, the …rst-order condition reduces to
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 1. If 1 ! +1, the …rst-order condition reduces to (divide by ( 1 ) 2 > 0 and consider the limiting case 1 ! +1)
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 0. The comparative statics show that taxes decrease with 1 , since
given 0 < t 1 < 1.
Point 3. The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 increases with the inequality aversion parameter r from no taxation if the planner is inequality neutral (t 1 ! 0 if r ! 0) to partial taxation if income is fully
( 1 1)
if r ! +1).
If there is no inequality aversion (r ! 0), then the …rst-order condition equals
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 0. The other case (r ! +1) leads to (divide by r > 0 and take the limit)
which can be solved to get
( 1 1 )
.
The comparative statics are
Using the …rst order condition, we can replace the numerator, to get
; which is positive, given 0 < t 1 < 1.
Point 4.
The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 increases with type heterogeneity 11 from no taxation if everyone has the same type (t 1 ! 0 if 11 ! 0) to complete taxation if types become very heterogeneous
If 11 ! 0, the …rst-order condition reduces to
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 0. If 11 ! +1, the …rst-order condition reduces to (divide by 11 > 0 and consider the limiting case 11 ! +1)
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 1. The comparative statics are
Point 5. The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 decreases with taste heterogeneity 11 from some taxation if everyone has the same taste (0 < t 1 < 1 if 11 ! 0) to zero taxation if tastes become very heterogeneous
If there is no taste heterogeneity ( 11 ! 0), then
which can lead to any tax rate satisfying 0 < t 1 < 1. The other case ( 11 ! +1) leads to (divide by 11 > 0 and consider the limiting case 11 ! +1)
which holds for t 1 ! 0. Taxes decrease with 11 , since
Point 6. The optimal tax rate t 1 on earnings x 1 decreases with the degree of control 1 from complete taxation if earnings cannot be controlled (t 1 ! 1 if 1 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 1. If 1 ! 1, the …rst-order condition reduces to
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 0. The comparative statics are
Dividing both sides by (1 1 ) 1 > 0 and using the …rst-order condition to replace 1 t1 1 t1 , we get
; which is negative, given point 1 (0 < t 1 < 1).
The Akerlof-case
Suppose there are two variables, earnings x 1 and an exogenous tag x 2 (thus, 2 ! 0). The …rst-order conditions reduce to
The second of the …rst-order conditions can be rewritten as the type correlation. This can be plugged in in the other …rst-order condition to get
The latter equation does not depend on t 2 and therefore completely describes the solution for t 1 , which can afterwards be plugged in in (28) to obtain a solution for t 2 . Before proceeding, note that we consider as primitives of the model and 12 = 12 p 11 22 adjusts.
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Point 1. From proposition 1, we already know that t 1 < 1 in the optimum, and it is easy to verify that t 1 < 0 cannot satisfy equation (29) . To summarize, we must have 0 < t 1 < 1. As a consequence, we also have t 2 T 2 if 12 T 0.
Point 2. The tax rate on earnings t 1 decreases with the degree of control 1 , ranging from full taxation if earnings cannot be controlled (t 1 ! 1 if 1 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled (t 1 ! 0 if 1 ! 1); the tag is fully taxed, both if there is no control over earnings and if there is full control over earnings (t 2 ! 2 , if either 1 ! 0 or 1 ! 1), but the change is unde…ned in general. We only know that, at 1 ! 0, the tax rate t 2 increases (resp. decreases) with 1 if the type correlation is positive (resp. negative) and vice-versa at 1 ! 1. (29) reduces to
which implies t 1 ! 1 and, using t 1 ! 1 in in (28), we get t 2 ! 2 . If 1 ! 1, condition (29) reduces to
which is satis…ed for t 1 ! 0 and this leads to t 2 ! 2 + (1 1 )
12
22
. The comparative statics for t 1 w.r.t. 1 are 
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We can divide both sides by 1 = 1 (1 1 + 2 ) > 0 and using the …rst-order condition to replace 1 1 t1 1 t1 , we get (after some manipulation) that
which is negative, given 0 < t 1 < 1. The comparative statics for t 2 w.r.t. 1 are
which is not de…ned in general.
is positive (resp. negative) if the type covariance/correlation is positive (resp. negative), while at
which leads to the opposite sign.
Point 3. The tax rate on earnings t 1 decreases with the cost of taxation 1 , ranging from t 1 ! 1 (if
The tax rate t 2 on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with the earnings elasticity 1 if the type correlation is positive (resp. negative), ranging from t 2 = 2 (if 1 ! 0)
If 1 ! 0, condition (29) reduces to
which implies t 1 ! 1 and t 2 ! t 2 = 2 . If 1 ! +1, we get r ( 1 ) 2 t 1 11 = 0; which implies t 1 ! 0 and this leads to t 2 = 2 + 12 r 11
22
(1 1 ). The comparative statics for t 1 w.r.t. 1 are
which is negative, i.e., the more elastic the lower the tax. The comparative statics for t 2 w.r.t. 1 are
the sign of which corresponds with the sign of the correlation.
Point 4. The tax rate on earnings t 1 increases with the type heterogeneity 11 for earnings, from t 1 ! 0 to t 1 ! 1; the tax rate on the tag t 2 equals 2 if there is no type heterogeneity 11 for earnings, while the comparative statics are unde…ned. the sign of which is not de…ned.
Point 5. The tax rate on earnings t 1 does not change with 22 . The tax rate on the tag t 2 increases (resp. decreases) with 22 if the type correlation is negative (resp. positive).
Condition (29) does not change with 22 , indicating that t 1 remains unchanged as well, thus
The tax rate on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with 22 if the correlation is negative (resp. positive), which can be seen from (
the sign of which is the same as the sign of 12 .
Point 8. The tax rate on earnings t 1 increases with the inequality aversion r, from t 1 ! 0 to t 1 !
( 1 1 
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Regression results Table 5 : Results from …rst stage regression Testing the if-condition in the weak hypothesis Decomposition for the di¤erent implicit tax rates 
Robustness checks
The benchmark results are based on equivalent incomes, estimated at the individual level for singles and couples together (while including a couple dummy). We think this is a good speci…cation: needs are crucial in all tax-bene…t systems and individual estimations are standard practice. Still, it is possible to come up with other speci…cations, leading to 8 di¤erent combinations (our preferred speci…cation is highlighted in italics):
2 output de…nitions: income versus equivalent income, 2 estimation levels: purely individual versus household averages, 2 estimation methods: singles and couples separately versus joint estimation.
We look at the sensitivity of our results for these alternative speci…cations. First, the order of solidarity found in Table 1 is more or less robust. Table 8 reports the average tax rate for the di¤erent characteristics for the preferred speci…cation (…rst column) and three other possible speci…cations. 37 The estimation level (individual or household level) does not induce big changes. However, if we change from equivalent income (…rst two columns) to income (last two columns), then the tax rate for needs goes down. And somewhat more surprisingly, the compensation rate for sex increases. To summarize, only the outcome speci…cation could change the order of compensation, and only for the characteristics needs and sex. Next, Figure 7 shows that the di¤erent speci…cations do a¤ect the implicit tax rates for the 'partial control' and the 'no control'composite both in the upper panel (joint estimation) and lower panel (separate estimation).
However, more important for our purposes is the fact that the tax rates for the 'no control' composite (the squares and triangles) always remain signi…cantly higher than for the 'partial control'characteristics (the dots and diamonds) in each alternative speci…cation. Finally, when looking at the fairness measure in Figure 6 , the main di¤erence is again due to the choice of output de…nition. When using income instead of equivalent income, the value of the fairness measure is on average about 0.25 higher. As a consequence, if we do not account for economies of scale within households, we must reject the hypothesis that there exist countries with a fair tax bene…t system. Still, the ranking of countries in terms of fairness turns out to be robust, irrespective of the choices made. 
